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Abstract
Worldwide in the 1990s over one billion persons are estimated to
have a purchasing power of below a dollar per day, the conventional de-
marcation of “absolute poverty.” Other dimensions of poverty, extending
beyond income measures to encompass a person’s broader capabilities and
social functioning, are less empirically accessible. Poverty is commonly
thought to be associated with high fertility and rapid population growth
(regionally, South Asia and Africa have the highest poverty rates), but that
view finds little support in the extensive statistical research literature on
population and poverty. However, a clear-cut depiction of such an institu-
tionally contingent relationship is not to be expected. Economy-wide ef-
fects of population change on poverty can be traced through direct changes
in distributional outcomes and through effects resulting from changes in
rural and urban environments and social organization. The indirect links
are complicated by problems of characterizing the urban informal sector
and by the relocation of poverty through migration (and its recomposition
through economic mobility). Analytical difficulties arise in stipulating ceteris
paribus conditions against which to assess demographic influences. Styl-
ized models can show how certain patterns of social structure and eco-
nomic transfers in a society sustain resilient “equilibrium trap” situations
that generate adverse demographic and poverty outcomes. Although nei-
ther fertility nor poverty is usefully regarded as a policy instrument, there
are policy measures that impinge on both. The familiar examples of these
are programs in education, health, and family planning. Policies in the eco-
nomic and political domain may be equally or more important. The
developmentalist strategies behind many of the strongest economic growth
performances of recent decades, albeit contentious on some other grounds,
have been associated with poverty alleviation and fertility decline.
This material may not be reproduced without written permission from the author.
In the mid-1990s the population growth rate of the world's less devel-
oped regions (in the UN's designation, comprising some four-fifths of the
total world population) is about 1.7 percent per year, well below its 1960s
peak of 2.5 percent. Average fertility, which was around 6 children per woman
in the 1960s, has fallen to near 3, its lowest level ever, and continues to
decline. For many countries that have experienced these demographic trends,
questions about the consequences of rapid population growth for society and
the economy might appear to be no longer matters for urgent investigation.
They could be left to more leisurely deliberation by social and economic
historians: still able to arouse heated debate but with answers that are of
diminished import for public policy and human welfare.
Several factors should give pause to any such relegation. First, the de-
mographic expansion implied by the projected future growth rate trend in
the less developed regions is roughly another doubling of population, an
additional 4 billion or so people to be accommodated, most of them coming
in the next three decades. Second, modest region-wide or country-wide aver-
age population growth rates often obscure much faster changes in the sizes
of particular population categories, with effects that may be very substantial.
Notable among such categories would be the older age groups and the popu-
lations of cities. Third, there is a section of the less developed regions, namely
the UN's category of “least developed,” where demographic conditions of
the 1960s or even earlier still prevail. The 10 percent of the world's popula-
tion contained in the least developed countries amounts to 600 million people.
These countries combine rapid population growth (2.6 percent per year) and
rates of economic growth that for several decades have left per capita in-
comes virtually unchanged (averaging about $1000 per year in purchasing
power terms in the mid-1990s). For them, population issues retain all their
former urgency.
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The issue I am concerned with here is the relationship between popu-
lation growth and poverty. Surprisingly to those who have only casual knowl-
edge of research in the area, this relationship is neither obvious nor well
established. Simple economic arguments would suggest that rapid popula-
tion growth worsens poverty. Population growth holds down returns to labor
relative to capital and other factors of production, depressing wages and
worsening the income distribution. Or, if we picture development in terms
of an initially small but expanding modern sector within a larger, backward
economy, population growth swells the traditional and informal labor force,
and delays the time at which modern-sector capital accumulation exhausts
the supply of subsistence-level workers. Yet such pieces of theory do not
suffice to demonstrate a negative effect. In more elaborate models and in the
real world things are more complicated. Time-lags, feedbacks, nonlinearities,
and reverse causation enter the picture, as do the institutional practices through
which societies mediate among competing claims on the social product. For
example, rapid population growth may be a consequence of advances in
health, signaling broad-based welfare improvement; economies may expand
rapidly with scant regard for equity, but nevertheless show plummeting fer-
tility levels; or societies may be in such economic disorder that continued
impoverishment coexists with virtually zero population growth.
These complications explain the hesitant way in which the link be-
tween population growth and poverty has been summarized in the recent
research literature. The dominant tone is caution and uncertainty in the face
of a complex relationship. There is little in this literature to support a strong
poverty-based rationale for reducing fertility. The most that the 1992 UNFPA
Consultative Meeting of Economists could conclude on the matter was that
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“[t]he causal links between population growth and absolute deprivation are
not well understood.... Research has not established a strong causal link run-
ning from high fertility to poverty” (United Nations Population Fund 1993:
50–51). World Bank economist Lant Pritchett (1997: 51) is brusquer: solid
evidence that population growth is “a cause or even an exacerbating condi-
tion of poverty” cannot be given “because there is none.”
Nevertheless, while acknowledging the complexity, it is likely that most
social scientists would accept that there is a connection between population
growth and poverty. In particular, achieving lower fertility, at least in some
circumstances (probably including those of most of the world’s poorest coun-
tries), is likely to help alleviate poverty. The reverse relationship—the effect
of poverty alleviation on fertility reduction—is also widely accepted. Hence,
for instance, the Programme of Action of the 1994 International Conference
on Population and Development in its section entitled “Population, sustained
economic growth and poverty” (§3.10–3.22) asserts that efforts to slow popu-
lation growth and to reduce poverty are mutually reinforcing.
The situation in which common-sense views about a particular conse-
quence of demographic change rest on an inconclusive body of research is
unfortunately all too familiar. It underlies the so-called revisionist argument
that holds population growth to be a comparatively marginal factor in the
development process. But while simple conclusions on population and pov-
erty are not to be expected, no implication of marginality should be drawn.
Complexity does not imply net inconsequence.
In this review I shall sketch enough of the details of the population-
poverty relationship to make clear why it is not amenable to a one-sentence
summary, but with no ambition of presenting a full-fledged account of the
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subject. My aim, rather, is to highlight the features that should plausibly
enter a policy-relevant restatement of the relationship. The definitional prob-
lems that surround the term “poverty” are a necessary starting point. No
single definition encompasses all the connotations of the term. Hence, to
avoid truncating the study at the outset we have to carry along a cluster of
concepts, ranging from the highly concrete to the quite intangible. The main
part of the review explores macro- and local-level aspects of the relation-
ship. There are many ways in which population growth can influence eco-
nomic and social outcomes in general and poverty in particular, connections
that work through a society's institutional and cultural make-up, its resource
endowments, and its natural and built environments. Often these involve
situations in which individual decisions or localized actions, rational within
their immediate context, generate external effects that harm others in the
society. The structural conditions under which such externalities tend to per-
sist are an important topic for investigation. Finally, I discuss the policy
implications of these observations and findings.
M EANINGS AND MEASUREMENT  OF POVERTY
At the start of the Handbook on International Poverty Research, Else
Øyen (1996: 3–4) characterizes poverty research as “a field where neither
the concepts and the methodologies, nor the theories are precise enough to
be useful working tools. . . .” In particular, she accuses researchers of using
“nonsensical poverty measures formulated in developed countries for an-
other time and another context.”
There are indeed definitional problems, but this is to overstate them.
The difficulties lie less in the fuzziness or nonsensical nature of measures
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than in the fact that there are a number of different concepts, each of which
can be termed “poverty,” each appropriately measured in its own way. A
single definition does not suffice.
Baulch (1996) presents a simple array of these poverty concepts. Most
elementary is the measure of deprivation in terms of the level of a person's
private disposable income or consumption. This can (and no doubt should)
be expanded to include use of common-property resources and government
transfers and services. It can be further elaborated to include measures of
private assets that can be transformed into consumption use in times of cri-
sis—a means of capturing individual economic vulnerability. These are all
more or less tangible components that can be expressed in monetary terms;
but there are also intangible factors that bear on poverty. Obligations from
kin or community that can be called on to smooth out consumption deficits
make up an informal category of assets that are embedded in particular pat-
terns of social relations. Even more intangible, but important in the subjec-
tive perception of poverty, are deprivations on the dimensions of dignity and
autonomy: lack of self-respect and perceived powerlessness.
Poverty in consumption terms can be gauged through standard survey
instruments. There are well-known practical difficulties in obtaining accu-
rate responses on income and assets, and intricate problems (conceptual as
well as empirical) in dealing with intrahousehold allocation. Both of the two
major international demographic survey-taking enterprises, the World Fer-
tility Survey and the Demographic and Health Surveys, made deliberate de-
cisions not to explore the economic status of households in their central ques-
tionnaires, on the grounds of the complexity of the subject and the likely
unreliability of responses. The reluctance of the WFS and DHS to explore
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economic issues was a missed opportunity to expand the empirical basis for
research on population and poverty. However, other household survey pro-
grams have not been deterred, notably the elaborate series of Living Stan-
dards Measurement Surveys undertaken by the World Bank.
The intangible dimensions of poverty raise rather more intractable
measurement problems. They call for investigation of resources and social
relations from the inside of a society, to spell out how people's behavioral
freedom and opportunities, as they see them, are constrained. Social pres-
sures can operate as stringently as legal prohibitions to limit choice in eco-
nomic and social behavior; internalized restraint—as in the so-called culture
of poverty—may have the same effect. Anthropological methods would be
needed to properly assess these factors, but such methods are time consum-
ing and their findings lack comparability. For rapid appraisals of subjective
poverty with more standardized comparative content, an interactive tech-
nique known as Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA) can be called on
(see Shaffer 1996).
Absolute poverty
Absolute poverty is a term that came into vogue in Robert S.
McNamara's tenure as World Bank president. It has the connotation of “utter
poverty” and seems sometimes to be used in that sense. Thus McNamara
(1995: 5) sees it as describing “those living, literally, on the margins of life.
Their lives are to such an extent characterized by malnutrition, illiteracy, and
disease as to be excluded from any reasonable definition of human dignity.”
But absolute poverty also has a straightforward, statistically accessible mean-
ing. It refers to “the inability to attain consumption levels which would be
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deemed adequate in only the poorest countries” (Ravallion et al. 1991: 346),
and is usually measured by a per capita real income below a fixed poverty
line. It stands in contrast to relative poverty. Countries set their own poverty
lines, influenced to some extent by their average consumption levels. Among
a number of poor countries, including some large ones like Indonesia and
Bangladesh, the line turns out to be very similar when gauged by purchasing
power: around US$30 per month, or $1 per day, at 1985 prices. This stan-
dard is used in the numerous World Bank poverty studies of recent years.
Worldwide in the mid-1980s, according to Ravallion et al. (1991), there
were 1.1 billion people in developing countries below a “dollar per day”
poverty line, and 700 million below a $23 per month line (corresponding to
India's standard) that these authors denote the “extreme absolute poor.” These
are the figures cited in the 1990 World Development Report, which was focused
on poverty. Estimates from a later, more elaborate study by the same World
Bank group, drawing on more recent and fuller survey data on consumption
expenditures, are given in Chen et al. (1994). Equivalent data from the UN
Development Programme's 1997 Human Development Report, eferring to
1993, are given in Table 1. They show a total of 1.3 billion absolute poor.
Differences in data sources and aggregation procedures can yield large
variations in these estimates. For example, the poverty rate for sub-Saharan Af-
rica, shown as 39 percent for 1993 in the 1997 Human Development Report
(and virtually the same rate for 1987 in an earlier HDR), is given as 53 percent
for 1990 in Chen et al. (1994: 370). Again, the Human Development Report’s
East Asia poverty rate is largely governed by China (the 26 percent average
for the region drops to 14 percent if China is excluded), but national income
data and purchasing power adjustments for China are especially problematic.
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Table 1 Numbers and percentage of population in absolute poverty for a
poverty line of $1 per day consumption expenditure (PPP$ at 1985 prices)
by major region of the developing world, 1993
Numbers Percentage
Region (millions) of population
South Asia 515 43
East Asia 446 26
Sub-Saharan Africa 219 39
Arab States 11 4
Latin America* 110 24
All developing countries 1301 32
* poverty line of $2 per day
Source: United Nations Development Programme 1997, Table 2.1.
The numbers or proportions of people in poverty is termed a headcount
index. This does not describe the depth of that poverty, which is clearly rel-
evant to a quantitative assessment. For the latter purpose, a supplementary mea-
sure, the poverty gap, is often used. The poverty gap is the aggregate incom
shortfall of all those below the poverty line as a proportion of aggregate
consumption—i.e., in a notional interpretation, the minimum fraction of con-
sumption that would have to be reallocated to eliminate absolute poverty.
Alternative survey-based measures of poverty
Survey data bearing on poverty are not confined to household income and
consumption. Examples of other survey-based information would include:
• Health or nutritional indicators, such as anthropometric measures
of nutrition or assessments of parasite load. These data are more
intrinsically tied to individuals than are pro-rated shares of house-
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hold income, thus circumventing the problem of imputing
intrahousehold allocation; but they may reflect other causes in
addition to poverty. Dasgupta (1993: 81–87, 90–97) gives a lucid
summary of the measurement problems.
• Infant and child mortality rates. Mortality rates correspond to ne-
gation of life chances in a literal sense. (They are of course not
meaningful for individual families or for small population groups.)
Acknowledging that mortality outcomes are sensitive to compara-
tively inexpensive government interventions in infrastructure, pub-
lic health, and education is not to lessen their link to poverty, broadly
construed, but merely emphasizes that some dimensions of pov-
erty may be fairly easily remedied.
• A broader measure of population health—or its complement, the
“burden of disease”—would cover both mortality and illness or
disability. An index of this kind is the so-called disability-adjusted
life years (DALY), which combines years lost through premature
mortality and years lived in an impaired state owing to disease or
disability. The latter years are weighted at levels between life and
death, depending on the seriousness of disability; other weights
used in the aggregation incorporate time-preference and social
valuations of life at different ages—complexities that are no doubt
necessary, but lessen the index's intuitive appeal. A sample result
is that in 1990 sub-Saharan Africa suffered 580 DALYs per 1000
persons (or person-years), whereas the developed countries incurred
only 100. (See World Bank 1993; Murray and Lopez 1996.) Popu-
lation health, however, includes major health effects of behavioral
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and chance factors (smoking-related illnesses, for instance) that
are not primarily linked to poverty. A DALY-like index that re-
flected health outcomes of poverty could presumably be designed,
and might prove instructive.
• Indicators of housing quality, access to clean water, etc. Many na-
tional sample surveys, such as India's NSS or Indonesia's
SUSENAS, from time to time collect housing quality data, espe-
cially information on number of rooms, construction materials
(roof, walls, floor) and floor space, source of drinking water, elec-
trification, and type of latrine. Ownership of consumer durables
(bicycles, radios, etc.) is also given in some household surveys.
Such data permit construction of ad hoc poverty indexes.
An effort to construct a composite index of poverty that can draw on
survey data but that extends beyond income criteria is described by Anand
and Sen (1997) and employed in the 1997 Human Development Report. The
Anand-Sen human poverty index (HPI) is made up of five components: the
proportion of deaths below age 40, the proportion illiterate, the proportion
without access to safe water, the proportion without access to health ser-
vices, and the proportion of underweight children below age 5. (The last
three are averaged to give a single proportion that is said to describe depriva-
tion in overall economic provisioning.) Clearly, the HPI is heavily weighted
toward basic health outcomes, and would correlate strongly with a summary
measure of mortality—the more so as health and literacy tend to be associ-
ated. It follows that the poverty rates it yields differ from those based on
income data. Thus the Human Development Report now distinguishes “hu-
man poverty” from “income poverty.” Looking at the data across broad re-
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gions, it notes particular divergences between the two kinds of poverty “in
the Arab States, where income poverty was reduced to 4 percent by 1993 but
human poverty was still 32 percent, and in Latin America and the Caribbean,
where human poverty has been reduced to 15 percent but income poverty is
still 24 percent” (United Nations Development Programme 1997: 23).
Capabilities and functionings
In his book Poverty and Famines, Amartya Sen (1981) pioneered a
major shift in understanding famine by stressing the role of a collapse of
“entitlements” to food. In the major famines he studied, Bengal in 1943,
Bangladesh in 1974, and Ethiopia in 1973, the cause was not an aggregate
shortage of food but the inability of major segments of the population to
establish entitlement to it. In Bengal and Bangladesh, depressed labor de-
mand and rising grain prices made food increasingly unaffordable to rural
wage laborers; in Ethiopia, pastoralists lost much of their trade-entitlement
to food with the death of their livestock. Enhancing security against famine
thus calls for an understanding of food entitlements—through study of the
nature and distribution of property rights and the structure of labor and prod-
uct markets—as much as for efforts to raise aggregate food supplies.
In the same study and in later writings (e.g., Sen 1990, 1992), Sen
discusses “the problems of establishing command over commodities” in more
general terms. This is what he calls the “acquirement problem.” Command
is established by use of a person's own endowments (of physical and human
capital) in production and exchange and by any of the various channels of
acquisition that are open. Social capital—resources inherent in networks of
kin and other kinds of obligational relationships—offers another potential
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source of command over commodities. In a socialist economy or a welfare
state some entitlement to commodities may also be conferred by virtue of
citizenship or legal residence, ensuring attainment of a prescribed minimum
consumption level. (The usual implicit assumption is that the channels used
are legal; however, command can of course be acquired through extra-legal
means—by force, deception, or theft.) The shift in emphasis is from income
or possessions to “functionings” or “capabilities.” Poverty, in this discourse,
is inadequacy of the command needed to achieve a minimal level of functioning.
This perspective might be criticized as tending to divert attention from
simple poverty-reduction measures like raising domestic food production—
which is associated with increased nutrient intake, lower mortality, and higher
labor productivity among the poor (see Timmer 1994). Undoubtedly, how-
ever, the factors that it emphasizes are properly seen as dimensions of pov-
erty and should somehow be made empirically accessible—though that is no
easy task. The “capability poverty measure” (CPM), introduced in the 1996
Human Development Report, may have been an attempt in that direction,
but its three ingredients seem not well described as representing “capabili-
ties”: the proportion of under-five children who are underweight; the propor-
tion of births attended by a trained health worker; and the rate of female illit-
eracy. (See United Nations Development Programme 1996: 27–28.)
Life cycle poverty
Research in both developed and developing countries has found sub-
stantial movement into and out of poverty. An apparent stability of income
distribution across families can disguise a rapid turnover in the identity of
individual families falling in any particular economic category. For the US,
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this was one of the principal findings of the elaborate Michigan Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (Duncan 1984: 10). In smallholder agrarian settings,
land sales are a sensitive indicator of economic mobility: Cain's (1981) analy-
sis of such data for Indian and Bangladesh villages shows how natural disas-
ters lead to distress sales of land in the absence of effective credit institutions
or public relief employment. The Bangladesh case, with such devices as yet
poorly developed, exhibited substantially greater economic mobility—espe-
cially downward mobility. The “environment of risk” faced by small land-
owners is itself a manifestation of poverty.
Families may of course move into or out of poverty for simple demo-
graphic reasons—as their ratio of economically active members to depen-
dent members changes over time. The empirical observation that poor house-
holds (where poverty is gauged by per capita household expenditure) tend to
be larger than rich ones is in part attributable to the dependency burden of
young children (Visaria 1980: 196–197; total household expenditures are
positively associated with household size). However, relationships between
household structure (or family structure) and poverty are intricate and per-
mit few uncontested generalizations. As Lloyd (1995: 26) puts it, the poor
“are found in households of every structure. . . . [T]here is nothing inherent
in a household's structure that predicts poverty or, alternatively, promises
resource adequacy.”
It is possible for the numbers of the poor to rise with population growth
at the same time as most of the original poor have become better off. Migra-
tion is an obvious circumstance in which this could happen, but it is not the
only one. Samuel Morley (1981) notes the implications for assessing pov-
erty-reduction measures through intertemporal comparisons, where the poor
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in the final period may include many different people from the poor at the
outset: “If we are interested in knowing how the poor of the base period
fared over time, and surely this is what the whole debate over trickle-down
is all about, the real income growth rates of the bottom kth percentile will not
tell us” (p. 287).
The other extreme to families that are only briefly in poverty are those
for whom poverty is an intergenerational phenomenon. Poverty that is “trans-
mitted” from one generation to the next in a family, through constriction of
educational or other opportunities for children or even through effects of
nutritional deprivation, represents a particularly serious category from the
standpoint of human welfare and social policy. The literatures on the “cul-
ture of poverty” in poor countries and the “underclass” in rich ones are con-
cerned with this potential intergenerational transmission and how it might
be interrupted. The topic is discussed below.
Subjective perceptions of poverty
How do poor people themselves describe their economic status and
changes in their economic circumstances? Jodha (1989: 182) has investi-
gated this question for members of poor rural households in India. He con-
solidates the responses into the following categories:
• degree of reliance on patrons or landlords for employment, inputs,
marketing of produce, off-season loans, etc.;
• degree of dependence on low-status jobs;
• options for geographic mobility and degree of liquidity;
• consumption patterns and practices, especially food quality and
variety;
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• household asset position, especially housing characteristics and
possession of consumer durables but also including access to com-
mon-property resources.
In Jodha's own village study, an income-based measure of poverty
shows an increase in poverty over two decades, but the villagers themselves
record some improvement on these other dimensions. Such a divergence is
not at all surprising: it merely underlines the impossibility of reducing a
complex, multifaceted process of change to a single index.
*   *   *
Definitional diversity is not usefully dealt with either by consolidation
or by selectivity. It can simply be accepted as a characteristic of this particu-
lar subject area. Poverty cannot wholly be captured in income terms. But we
should resist equating poverty with all kinds of disadvantage. Thus, it is
worth preserving the distinction between poverty and health indexes—against
the tendency noted above in the operationalization of the “human poverty”
concept. It may also be worth guarding against built-in assumptions about
appropriate government roles in provision of health services and education
that come with too complete a distinction between human- and income-pov-
erty. That public-sector provision of such services offers one way to reach
the poor does not mean that it is necessarily a superior route to simple in-
come subvention or, indeed, to plain economic growth.
MACRO-L EVEL  POPULATION -POVERTY  CONNECTIONS
Elementary economics tells us that abundance of labor in an economy
will make for low wages relative to rents. It tells us that the faster population
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grows, the greater the requirement for investment that simply maintains the
level of capital per head—implying less output available for current con-
sumption or for investment in raising capital per head (capital deepening)
and thus for future consumption. As Solow (1970: 29) put it, “An economy
that must in a steady state support a more rapidly growing population will sup-
port it at a lower standard of consumption, given the savings rate.” These
simple propositions underpin the intuitive expectation that rapid population growth
will tend to produce higher levels of poverty than low population growth.
Nevertheless, the economic case for population growth generating
poverty has had a chequered career over recent decades. Technological change
and human capital, not material resources, came to be seen as the major
factors in explaining economic growth, readily able to overcome diminish-
ing returns to labor. Neoclassical growth theory, the ruling theoretical para-
digm, for the most part ignored issues of labor absorption and unemploy-
ment. On its steady-state growth paths, the economy was expanding
exponentially at the rate of growth of the labor force plus that of labor pro-
ductivity. Population, in this stylized view, became little more than an index
of the scale of the economy, poverty a marginal phenomenon; neither held
much theoretical interest.
In the 1960s development economics emerged as a field in its own
right, distinct from the theory of economic growth. In it, population for a
time regained a substantial place, seen as influencing overall economic out-
comes and, in particular, affecting poverty. This was the heyday of dual
economy models, in the major variant of which development was envisaged
as an expanding modern sector drawing on the labor and savings of a “tradi-
tional” agricultural (or urban informal) sector (see Lewis 1954 and Fei and
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Ranis 1964). Under successful development, the surplus labor is eventually
exhausted, after which wages progressively rise on an economy-wide growth
path. While actual labor market structures and wage determination processes
are far more complicated than such models assume, it seemed possible to
roughly locate the period over which the labor surplus (in Lewis's apt ex-
ample, household servants) dries up. This “turning point” when dualism is
eliminated was likely also to mark a decisive phase in poverty reduction,
beyond which poverty would be associated with particular sources of disad-
vantage rather than characterizing substantial parts of the labor force. Rapid
population growth would retard the time at which that point was reached.
The independent status of development economics was always tenu-
ous, however. The institutional obstacles it gave salience to were often shown
to be mirages, vanishing under price reform and other standard economic
recipes. Clive Bell (1987), in The New Palgrave, writes of the subject being
“drawn back into the fold” of micro- and macro-economics proper. Popula-
tion went with it. Even dualism could be restated in fully neoclassical terms,
with population effects reduced to near inconsequence (as, for instance, in
Kelley and Williamson 1974). The 1986 report on population and economic
growth of the National Research Council, summarized by its co-chair as
“support[ing] the conclusion that population growth has little or no negative
effect on economic development” (Johnson 1994: 524), accepted this reinte-
gration and appeared to confirm the inconsequence. The “new growth theory”
of the 1980s and 1990s, with its role for increasing returns and historical
fortuity, has little to say about population size.
An intriguing development in the 1990s has been the second thoughts
about the effects of population growth that have emerged from cross-sec-
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tional analysis applied to 1980s data (e.g., in Kelley and Schmidt 1994) and
from a close look at the strong economic performance of East Asia in the
1970s and 1980s. In the latter case, the early fertility decline and consequent
fall in youth dependency in most of these countries is now seen by some econo-
mists, echoing the Coale-Hoover argument, as contributing to their surge in in-
vestment (see Higgins and Williamson 1997). Significantly, East Asian poverty
rates also fell sharply over this period. However, the finding is still circumstan-
tial: there are various competing accounts of the “East Asian miracle.”
The prima facie empirical case for the unimportance of population has
come from cross-country analysis. Scatter plots of countries on axes repre-
senting population growth rates versus per capita GNP or more refined in-
dexes of income-poverty are famously unpersuasive. High-population-growth
countries are nearly all poor, but the association is anything but tight. (It is
certainly negative, but that is hardly surprising given the overall demographic
contrast between rich and poor countries.) The same opaque relationships
can be reproduced using numerous pairs of demographic and economic vari-
ables (McNicoll 1984: 211).
Both mortality and fertility contribute to the confused picture (migra-
tion does too, in the case of some outliers). There are steep income effects on
mortality at low incomes—see Preston (1980)—and few exceptions to low
fertility at high incomes, but wide variations in each over a broad middle-
income range. Poverty measures with substantial demographic content, like
the Human Poverty Index, are definitionally linked to mortality. Consider-
able noise is added to this and analogous bivariate relationships by the varia-
tion among countries in political and economic systems and social institu-
tions—which together affect both economic performance and capacities to
influence demographic outcomes.
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Multivariate analysis does little to clarify the matter. Theoretical sup-
port can be found for various causal paths between population and poverty,
in both directions. Moreover, the underlying models must assume cross-coun-
try regularities in development patterns that are belied by the actual diversity
among countries. Not surprisingly, no sharp picture emerges. The careful
aggregative modeling by Rodgers (1984) concludes on the overall slight-
ness of the adverse population growth effect. In a later piece he writes:
“[T]here is little empirical evidence to support the proposition that popula-
tion growth is a major constraint on the alleviation of poverty.... Population
growth is both a cause and a consequence of poverty, and unravelling the
pattern of causation may be an almost hopeless task” (Rodgers 1989: 9).
Ahlburg (1996), extending an analysis of poverty change by Squire (1993),
finds no association of population growth with changes in poverty. Lipton
(1997) is an exception, reporting a “large” positive effect of fertility on sub-
sequent poverty in a 28-country analysis. Timmer (1994: 262) comments on
population-poverty research that “because of path-dependency and impor-
tant dynamic feedback effects, cross-sectional evidence can offer only lim-
ited insights.”
Is aggregative analysis then of no help in illuminating the population-
poverty relationship? That would be an undue concession to agnosticism, on
two grounds. First, an explanatory calculus that finds little to be explained
may simply be unsuited to the analytical task. Poverty manifestly remains in
many countries; economies often regress; not all dysfunctional institutional
structures vanish or costlessly adapt as a result of getting prices right. Our
calculus needs to accommodate these elements and outcomes. Second, a
murky cross-sectional picture, as we have noted, does not prove the absence
of a relationship. If cross-country studies tell us little, we are thrown back on
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single-country analysis or on cautious and selective use of country compari-
sons. The difficulties of dealing with counterfactuals—investigating what
would have happened had conditions been different in specified ways—then
have to be faced, but that task is familiar to historians and differs mainly in
degree from the one routinely encountered in doing sensitivity analysis.
Social and environmental settings of population-poverty
relationships
In any economy, adding more people has a complex and ramifying set
of welfare effects. These effects depend on technological and institutional
features of that economy, on its natural resources, on the social and cultural
makeup of the surrounding society through which claims on the social prod-
uct are allocated, and not least on the characteristics of the additional people.
Efforts to model effects of population growth must ignore most of these possible
sources of variation in outcome (usually by assuming other things equal) and
drastically simplify the rest. Of course, this is a state of affairs met with in
modeling any aspect of social change, but it is important to keep it in mind.
For national populations, the implicit comparison against which ef-
fects of rapid population growth are gauged would usually be the
counterfactual case in which growth is reduced because fertility has fallen.
The rapid growth would presumably have resulted from an earlier reduction
of mortality—clearly in itself a welfare improvement. High fertility may or
may not include a significant component of “unwantedness” that would make
fertility reduction in itself a contribution to (parental) wellbeing: survey re-
sponses would suggest that it does—at least for the mother—but the matter
remains controversial. For macro-level analysis, a conservative assumption
23
would be to ignore the difficulties of unwantedness estimation but to ac-
knowledge that actual fertility levels respond to social and economic change
in fairly predictable ways.
For population growth that is a consequence of migration rather than
natural increase, the welfare calculation should presumably consider changes
in each of the three groups concerned: the migrants, the receiving society,
and the society of origin.
The labor surplus models mentioned earlier directed attention to the
process of labor absorption—and, by implication, poverty alleviation—in
economic development. Thus, Portes and Benton (1984: 589) could write
that “[o]ne of the few points of agreement in the area of development is that
poverty is a direct result of unemployment or underemployment and, hence,
that overcoming poverty requires the mass incorporation of the working-age
population into modern industrial employment.” But an undifferentiated sub-
sistence sector, especially one primarily identified with agriculture, is an
unsatisfactory way of locating poverty and tracing its changing incidence.
Further specification of the setting is required, in terms of economic institu-
tions (the labor market and credit systems, and other aspects of production
relations); government roles and more general patterns of social organiza-
tion; and resource availabilities and environmental conditions. In particular,
we should be interested in how demographic change impinges on this set-
ting and in exploring its consequent effects on people's command over com-
modities. While often this specification task must involve investigation of
micro-level social, economic, and environmental change (more on this be-
low), some more aggregative empirical observations and modeling direc-
tions are also relevant.
24
A simple framework for organizing the discussion would identify three
routes through which population change may affect poverty. The “direct”
one is the population-economy link. The economy, broadly interpreted, in-
corporates market-based and other institutional means of income (or, more
generally, “command over commodity”) distribution. Included in those
“other” means are contributions to the social wage through the public-sector
provision of health, educational, and other services. Poverty outcomes are
one part of this overall distributional function. In addition, population change
itself, to the extent that it brings about or entails an altered demographic structure
of households, may have a simple arithmetic effect on consumption.
The other two routes take account of possible changes in the environ-
mental and social setting. Many population-related environmental changes
have effects on poverty. We can write:
∆ Population → ∆ Environment → ∆ Poverty
(where ∆ signifies “change in”). A somewhat distinct triplet would link popu-
lation and poverty through effects on social organization, though this as yet
has been far less researched than the environmental link:
∆ Population → ∆ Social organization → ∆ Poverty.
Poverty, in turn, would often have consequences for both environment
and the social order, and environmental change and social (in)stability are
themselves sometimes connected. These additional relationships rapidly com-
plicate the picture. Moreover, the ∆ notation leaves ambiguous the matter of
contingency: it does not specify (to put it a different way) how the partial
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derivatives are partialed. Thus, to identify any relationship working through
environmental change involves making assumptions about social organiza-
tion—at a minimum, a ceteris paribus stipulation. Analogous assumptions
on the environment are required in tracing causal paths through social ar-
rangements.
Poverty links to environmental change (separating urban and rural set-
tings) and to social instability are treated in the remainder of this section.
Poverty and the urban informal sector
If industrial employment generation fails to keep up with growth in
the labor supply, the working-age population backs up in low-productivity
activities and all-but-open unemployment—that is, in the usual understand-
ing of the term, in the informal sector. This sector is seen as a kind of labor
sump, “a refuge for those unable to find jobs in the modern sector” (Portes
1997: 249). It is not in any sense uniform: this description, emphasizing the
range of near-subsistence or illicit activities it contains, is from McNicoll
(1984: 208):
[T]here is a fairly clear productivity ladder down which mar-
ginal labor force entrants find themselves pressed as their num-
bers increase in the absence of either an open land frontier or an
otherwise expanding economy. . . . Any economy offers a wide
range of open-entry, low-productivity occupations, for the most
part entailing self-employment but with a minimal requirement
for working capital. Handicraft production, micro-scale trading
and arbitrage, and personal services of all sorts are the main ar-
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eas of this activity, highly visible in most poor countries. . . .
Extortion and theft, of course, are direct means of access to prod-
uct, and clearly open-entry occupations.
In a broadly similar vein, Sachs (1990: 99) describes the Brazilian case as a
“process of exclusion and social segregation, creating a huge surplus of un-
deremployed labor in our cities.”
But Sachs also notes the intricate organizational structures that de-
velop and the social capital that can be mobilized. The result is “a maze of
interconnected labor, service, and goods markets, ranging from organized
business to organized crime, a non-market household sector, as well as an
incipient non-market social sector based on mutual help.” Indeed, the infor-
mal sector can be seen less as a labor sump than as a dynamic source of
microscale entrepreneurship for the economy. This view first came to promi-
nence in the work of Hernando De Soto (1989), to whom informal economic
activity appears as a dynamic response to the institutional rigidities of over-
regulated or statist economies. Unregulated enterprise, far from being the
survival behavior of a near-destitute labor reservoir, becomes the entrepre-
neurial feedstock of development. The poverty issue does not wholly vanish
but is relegated to the status of a comparatively fringe concern. In Portes and
Schauffler's (1993: 55) paraphrase of De Soto, “the informal sector is not
part of the problem of underdevelopment, but part of its solution.”
In any particular case, the two pictures must somehow be reconciled
with the single empirical reality. Whatever grass-roots dynamism the infor-
mal sector might display, part of that reality for many cities is a physical
environment dominated by poorly serviced squatter settlements—
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shantytowns, bidonvilles, and favelas—the environment, for example, that
Scheper-Hughes (1992) wrote about in Death Without Weeping. Many cities
in the developing countries have been growing at double the rate of natural
increase of population: rates of 5 percent per year are common, a doubling
time of 14 years. Under those conditions physical infrastructure would be
hard pressed to keep pace, even with a booming economy (as, for instance,
in China’s coastal provinces). With more typical economic performance, the
quality of the built environment is virtually bound to fall; public health is
likely to suffer along with it. Brockerhoff and Brennan (1998) analyze DHS
data on city populations to show the adverse effects of rapid population growth
on infant mortality in cities, a link found to be especially pronounced in
Latin America.
Plausibly, the two pictures are only superficially inconsistent. Portes
and Schauffler (1993) propose such a compromise. Their interpretation calls
for a typology of informal activities, recognizing both the dynamism of many
microenterprises and the precarious lives of many people in the sector. Some
amount of dynamism and off-the-books organization in economic activity
and elaborate networks of mutual assistance can coexist with a broad degree
of material poverty. How much is hard to gauge: by their nature, estimates of
the size of the informal economy, and thus of the incomes of its participants,
are error-prone. (Mortality rates, or more general measures of “human pov-
erty,” escape this problem for population groups.) The static aggregate situ-
ation, however, would be of less interest than the detailed directions of change:
whether poverty, however construed, was a diminishing phenomenon along
the life cycle of most individuals or whether it permanently identified a sub-
stantial subgroup. While this is likely to hinge mainly on the overall pace of
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economic growth, instances where particular social groups face continued
exclusion from economic opportunity are not uncommon.
Rural poverty and the environment
A necessary byproduct of rapid urbanization and declining fertility is a
fall in rural population growth. In much of the developing world rural popu-
lations will cease expanding within a decade or two; in some countries they
have already started to contract. For the natural environment, population
growth effects, whatever they may have been, will diminish. (Indirect ef-
fects may of course continue: ambitions for self-sufficiency in food produc-
tion for growing national populations may dictate continued expansion of
agricultural areas, often with adverse environmental consequences.) Sub-
Saharan Africa is the main exception to this reversal, with population growth
remaining a rural as well as urban reality.
There is of course no simple connection between rural poverty and
population growth. This is the terrain on which Malthusian and Boserupian
models contend and the location of the original “tragedy of the commons.”
Moreover, it is not just population numbers that potentially matter: poverty
outcomes may be influenced, for example, by disproportionate outmigration
from the most economically active age groups. Consider the range of re-
sponses to population growth in a subsistence agrarian economy. They might
be categorized as follows:
• extension of cultivated area through conversion of pastoral or for-
ested land, or cultivation of steeper slopes and other marginal land;
• intensification of production through improved varieties and in-
puts, multiple cropping, etc.;
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• population limitation through (voluntary) outmigration or birth con-
trol;
• forcible exclusion of part of the population from access to the so-
cial product;
• diminished welfare for some or all of the population or increased
dependency on outside subventions.
The list is not exhaustive but covers the principal possibilities. It mixes
“effective” responses, in which agriculture proves a dynamic growth sector
and a potential source of investment for the rest of the economy, and “inef-
fective” responses that yield poverty, social disorder, and environmental deg-
radation. Commonly, responses would encompass elements of several of these
categories, the balance varying over different social groups. The actual out-
come in a particular case depends on resource endowments, inherited insti-
tutional and cultural practices, the course of political development, compe-
tency in public administration and development planning, and some measure
of chance. There would usually be winners and losers but a rough consensus
could probably be reached on whether rural poverty had risen or fallen. Where
there is a net income gain, it is at least theoretically possible for the losers to
be compensated so that no one is worse off, either through deliberate inter-
vention or by trickle-down effects.
Consider some instances on the ineffective side. Population growth in
nineteenth-century Ireland played an underlying role in creating that region's
extreme vulnerability to crop failure, with its outcome at mid-century of
starvation and mass emigration. Nepal and the Philippines in recent decades
offer pictures of population pressures leading to ecologically unsound spread
of upland cultivation, producing severe environmental degradation and
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outmigration—to the Terai and to Mindanao, respectively (see Eckholm 1976,
Seddon 1989, and Ooi 1988). In the lowland tropics, even where erosion is
not a problem, the soil quality of much newly deforested land falls off sharply
after a few seasons, offering little prospect for subsequent intensification—
indeed, often ending in abandonment. The case of Brazil is most familiar,
with rapid population growth in Amazonia (the migrants coming from else-
where in the rural sector) producing these outcomes. Bangladesh has wit-
nessed a long process of impoverishment in situ, through plot subdivision
and extension of cultivation on to hazardous delta islands, as rural popula-
tion densities have risen to extreme levels. Sub-Saharan Africa presents no-
table instances of the breakdown of rural agricultural systems and subse-
quent impoverishment, but for the most part these do not belong in this
category: the environmental outcomes have been byproducts of destruction
of social infrastructure, leading to endemic insecurity, population displace-
ment, and heightened mortality.
As with the urban informal sector, the population-environment-pov-
erty link tells only one strand of the rural change story. For example, eco-
logical degradation in Nepal and elsewhere in the Himalayas can be ex-
plained in considerable measure without invoking human agency. The deep
lowland soils of the northern subcontinent come from eons of heavy but
“natural” erosion, leading some alpine ecologists to dismiss “ecocatastro-
phe” accounts such as Eckholm's as unsubstantiated (see Ives and Messerli
1989). In another exemplary environmental disaster, the apparently irrevers-
ible degradation of the agricultural region surrounding the Aral Sea—and
the shrinkage of the sea itself—while it has clearly led to widespread rural im-
poverishment, is almost entirely attributable to drastically ill-conceived plan-
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ning decisions (Kasperson et al. 1995). Again, natural increase of populati n
had little to do with the Brazilian experience of falling incomes of small
farmers as landholdings were consolidated and operations commercializ d
in the 1970s. Both the frontier migration and the extrusion of labor out of the
agricultural sector altogether were consequences of this severe contraction in
labor demand (see Merrick and Berquo 1983: ch. 4; Wood and Perz 1996).
Deterioration of the natural systems on which agriculture depends, such
as watersheds and aquifers, can be potent causes of increased poverty in
expanding rural populations. Even if these factors are comparatively stable,
however, behavioral responses to rising densities may impede economic
progress. The Malthusian model, and its later formalization as the low-level
equilibrium trap (Leibenstein 1954, Nelson 1956, and, in modern garb, Becker
et al. 1990), are hypotheses about rural populations that encompass this as-
sertion. Some others are discussed below. For the most part, as with other
highly abstract models (Boserup's included), they are best seen as stylized
perceptions about the world rather than as formulations amenable to empiri-
cal testing. Unquestionably the rural populations of Bangladesh or India would
be much better off today if they had not more than doubled their numbers
over the last few decades: whether or not we describe the outcome as a trap,
there must be structural reasons why the society did not follow the path of
macro-level rationality. Abstract theorizing about such reasons, however, can-
not substitute for historical analysis.
Population growth and the social order
A potentially powerful macro-level argument linking population growth
and poverty derives from the assertion that demographic forces can under-
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mine the social order—and in the limiting case, lead to outright state failure.
Political disorder and consequent erosion of social capital can drastically
impede routine economic activity. If it persists, it may destroy the institu-
tional—and material —base of production and distribution, generating wide-
spread poverty. Can such a link can be empirically sustained?
Recent writings making a population growth-conflict case include those
of Homer-Dixon (1991, 1994), Goldstone (1991, 1997), and, in more popu-
lar vein, R.D. Kaplan (1996). The reports issued by the University of Toronto's
Project on Environment, Population and Security present a series of country
studies that investigate the likely political consequences of emerging renew-
able-resource scarcities. Population growth is one of the causes of scarcity,
migration is often one of the effects. (See, for example, the study of water
scarcity in China by Economy 1997.) Goldstone investigates the tensions
generated by population expansion under inflexible or maladapting institu-
tions in a series of historical and contemporary contexts.
Environmental scarcity, in Homer-Dixon's usage, can result from
change in access to resources or a change in distributive systems as well as
from resource depletion or degradation, so that demographic causes would
rarely stand alone. In turn, scarcity raises the financial and political demands
on governments and reduces their revenues. “A widening gap between state
capacity and demands on the state, along with the misguided economic in-
terventions such a gap often provokes, aggravates popular and elite griev-
ances, increases rivalry between elite factions, and erodes the state's legiti-
macy” (Homer-Dixon 1994: 25).
Drawn-out civil conflict and resulting decay of state legitimacy and
capacity would nearly always be accompanied by drastic economic deterio-
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ration. The African examples of Somalia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone are cases
in point. (The converse argument, that impoverishment will generate civil
unrest, finds relatively little support.) However, conflict does not necessarily
lead to impoverishment. For example, the economic impact of a violent change
of regime would usually be severe but may be fairly transitory and affect
mainly the more capitalized sectors.
The Rwanda experience warrants separate mention. The 1994 mass
killings in that country and the civil war and massive refugee exodus that
followed have provided grist for many assertions that such a tragedy was
almost a predictable outcome of population growth coming up against hard
resource constraints. By implication, Rwanda was merely a more immediate
and genocidal version of the state failure seen elsewhere. This seems not to
have been the case (see Percival and Homer-Dixon 1995, Prunier 1995).
Certainly Rwanda had an extraordinarily high rate of population increase
(well over 3 percent annually) in the 1970s and 1980s, and rural population
densities had reached extreme levels by the 1990s. But Rwanda was a strong
state by African standards; the civil war and the regime change that resulted
were not at all drawn out. Careful analysis of the 1994 events depicts a more
complex set of antecedents, located in a distinctive set of political actors and
economic interests. Nevertheless, the demographic saturation of an agrarian
economy was an evident background condition that sustained the communal
tensions, and continues to do so, even if it did not create them. Explanation
on an immediate political level is not inconsistent with a longer-range view
that accords significant weight to population change.
Management of development is a comparatively recent expectation of
governments. Administrative incompetence and rent-seeking, on the other
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hand, have been perennial expectations. Complaints about them were re-
frains of the classical economists. In Malthus's explanation of agrarian pov-
erty in the Ottoman Empire, for example, the government's “tyranny, its
feebleness, its bad laws and worse administration of them, together with the
consequent insecurity of property, throw such obstacles in the way of agri-
culture that the means of subsistence are necessarily decreasing yearly...”
(Essay, 3rd ed., Bk. 1, Ch. 10). Extortionate government rent-seeking, chok-
ing off economic growth in its infancy and leaving the effort to be dissipated
in population increase, is seen by E.L. Jones (1988) as a repeated story in
world history from the ninth to the eighteenth centuries. Jones describes the
pattern as a low-level political trap—the eventual twin escapes from which
gave rise to the industrial revolutions of Europe and Japan. Partial modern ana-
logues would appear to be common, where persistence of a population-poverty
connection turns out to have much to do with a predatory government.
*   *   *
A sufficient explanation for lack of conclusiveness in international
cross-sectional studies of population and poverty is the diversity of environ-
ments and institutional settings that are encompassed. Major compositional
changes underway in the population, particularly urbanization, might simi-
larly obscure the relationship: the direct effects of population growth are
being literally transferred away from rural areas and concentrated in the cit-
ies. Urban environments, however, are themselves subject to degradation,
both on their intensive margin—the preexisting built environment and physi-
cal infrastructure—and on their extensive margin, through expansion of squat-
ter settlements. Poverty in such areas is manifested in low consumption lev-
els, economic and perhaps physical insecurity, paucity of economic
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opportunity, and poor health status of the population. Rural environmental
degradation that can be tied to population growth (in the face of technologi-
cal and institutional rigidities) has plausibly contributed significantly to ex-
isting rural poverty in many countries. In the future, however, demographic
influence on rural environments will increasingly be a generalized demand
effect on the agricultural sector. Any resulting degradation may or may not
accentuate poverty but would more clearly be seen as a failure of gover-
nance or institutional design. Finally, population growth impinges on the
social order, weakening public administration and impeding the emergence
of civil society. The intangible returns from social capital are thereby low-
ered—returns that are potentially as appreciable a contribution to individual
welfare and a defense against poverty as direct government services.
LOCAL  SCENARIOS OF IMPOVERISHMENT
The discussion in the preceding section points strongly to population
growth contributing to poverty in many situations, either through direct dis-
tributional changes in the economy or through routes that involve changes in
environmental conditions and social institutions. In each case, no blanket
conclusions can be drawn, since outcomes depend on the detailed specifica-
tion of the setting. There are no automatic linkages, only contingent ones.
However, we can appreciably buttress the overall argument by examining
the sorts of circumstances that generate population-poverty relationships at
the local level.
Micro-level theories of demographic change are essentially formaliza-
tions or elaborations of benefit-cost calculations by individuals or families.
The best known examples are the works of Becker (1991) and Caldwell
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(1978) on fertility and Harris and Todaro (1970) on migration. Fertility deci-
sions adjust to changes in the perceived costs and benefits of children—with
“costs” covering also opportunity and birth control costs. The “perceived”
qualification allows for a disjunction between subjective and objective situ-
ations. (Although these models are sometimes thought to define a reality in
which family planning programs have no role, both knowledge and accept-
ability of modern birth control methods can clearly be treated within them.)
Migration decisions are more simply reducible to a mainly economic calcu-
lus, though with a sometimes ill-defined distinction between purely indi-
vidualistic decisionmaking and the family acting as a miniature corporate
entity seeking regional diversification. Child mortality has much less behav-
ioral content, but such a component may still be present: for example, child
mortality is influenced by the nature of “health-seeking behavior” on the
part of parents and perhaps by intrahousehold allocation decisions.
Understanding the family economy and its demographic responses to
changed circumstances and opportunities does not in itself shed much light
on population-poverty relationships. The prices and other incentives that
determine the costs and benefits of demographic behavior are set by eco-
nomic forces, social organization, and cultural patterns that an individual
family neither controls nor much influences. We thus need to set the family
within its material and social environment, and explore the dynamics of this
somewhat larger system. The aim is to identify the kinds of organizational
patterns that tend to connect population growth and poverty.
Intrafamily transmission of poverty
A familiar explanation for continued high fertility under difficult eco-
nomic conditions is that parents in fact stand to benefit from having many
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children. The simple arithmetic that each additional child dilutes family in-
come (which was the main fact driving the Coale-Hoover model, for long
the chief rationale for birth control programs) is countered by the subsequent
contribution that children make. Children may contribute to family income
and to the care of younger siblings from a relatively early age, perhaps at
some cost to their own economic prospects; and they may have an asset- and
insurance-role for the family—bringing in dowry or bridewealth, establish-
ing kinship links through marriage, and providing support and protection to
parents in old age. In the terms used by Caldwell (1978), the net “wealth
flows” in the family go from children to parents. The picture conveyed is
one of patriarchal wellbeing supported by the economic transfers generated
by high fertility, benefiting the family as a whole—albeit unevenly across its
members. (Admittedly, solid empirical support for such transfers as a gen-
eral picture has proven elusive, and there are emerging strands of
counterargument—see Lee 1997, and for a critique rooted in evolutionary
theory, H. Kaplan 1994.)
Against this traditional if somewhat stylized hypothetical pattern, we
can contrast the modern expectation that children of large families would be
significantly disadvantaged, particularly in terms of educational investments.
Such an effect was seen in the classic work of Blau and Duncan (1967) on
occupational mobility in the United States and in results of the subsequent
Occupational Change in a Generation study (see Blake 1989). Yet surpris-
ingly, recent research on poor countries is inconclusive. Lloyd's (1994) ex-
amination of the evidence finds only a small negative effect—though the
average disguises substantial selective disadvantage to some siblings, par-
ticularly females. Kelley (1996: 110) concludes from an exhaustive review
of quantitative studies that “evidence on the impact of family size on educa-
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tional outcomes is mixed, showing no convincingly consistent and strong
impact, one way or the other.” Of course, at least at the primary level, direct
schooling costs are to some degree socialized in most countries, so sib-size
effects would be lessened. As development proceeds, other educational costs
would come to dominate and any residual economic advantages of family
size would diminish.
Notwithstanding this overall ambiguity, there are particular circum-
stances in which the costs of a family's high fertility clearly fall on the chil-
dren. This is the case where high fertility is associated with an early start to
childbearing and close birth spacing, or with “unwanted” births. Poor fami-
lies are likely to be especially susceptible in these respects, through initially
lower education, less access to health care, and often less effective birth
control. Children's health as well as their education may suffer: for example,
parental malnutrition can lead to low-birthweight children and greater risk
of stunted development. The likely outcome is to reproduce poverty in the
next generation.
Oberai (1993: ch. 6) cites various studies that find high fertility in poor
urban families—two or more sons—to be in part a strategy aimed at combat-
ing poverty by enhancing economic security, leading to the familiar vicious
circle: “low incomes ensure poor education, nutrition and health, which in
turn lead to low productivity and low incomes” (p. 191). Efforts to achieve
low fertility as a path to economic mobility—as argued, for example, by
those who perceive “poverty-induced” fertility declines (see A.M. Basu
1986)—are consistent with this story.
At least as important as formal education in the intergenerational trans-
mission of poverty are the intangible qualities of childraising. The dysgenic
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fears that Darwinism had given rise to were found to be groundless, but not
the inheritance of disadvantage through the economic and cultural spheres.
Thomas Sowell (1983: 255) has stressed the effect of disadvantage here, in
contrast to family surroundings “where the values and patterns of life were a
human capital that made economic success more readily attainable.” As fer-
tility comes to acquire an inverse gradient by income, the proportion of chil-
dren raised in conditions of disadvantage rises substantially.
“Tragedy of the commons”
Garrett Hardin's famous article (1968) gives a stylized picture of popu-
lation-induced impoverishment through overexploitation of common-prop-
erty resources. His reference is to pre-enclosure rural Britain, describing a
situation in which each new person in a rural community supposedly added
a further claim to use of common grazing lands. Beyond some limit in live-
stock numbers the productivity of the commons would decline, perhaps dras-
tically. Implicitly, the community is taken as composed of members with
more or less uniform power, unable or unwilling to act concertedly to im-
pose a management regime to resolve the predicament or to countenance its
imposition by unilateral action. The situation is modeled by an n-person
prisoner's dilemma, in which each player has an immediate incentive to pur-
sue autonomously self-interested behavior unless a binding agreement to act
in the common interest can be reached. Of course if such an agreement can
be reached, the outcome is superior for all. Dasgupta and Mäler (1994: 23–
24) note that there is no necessity that agreement has to entail centralized
supervention: decentralized participatory arrangements can be found and
would often be preferred.
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 Hardin's aim, like that of many subsequent writers on the case, is to
illuminate processes of ecological degradation in rural poor-country situa-
tions. The common-property resources in question are usually assumed to be
open-access forests (as sources of fuelwood and leaf fodder) and local aqui-
fers (for well water). For the dry regions of India, Jodha (1985, 1990) lists
community pastures, community forests, waste lands, common dumping and
threshing grounds, watershed drainages, village ponds, and rivers. With over-
use, the productivity of these resources declines, with immediate and dispro-
portionate impact on the poor. The population connection is evident. From
an early age children can undertake such essential family tasks as gathering
fuel, carrying water, or caring for livestock. But the population growth thereby
sustained further worsens the environment's capacity to supply fuel, water,
and pasture—thus maintaining or even raising the value of children to par-
ents. Dasgupta's (1993) treatise, An Inquiry into Well-Being and Destitution,
discusses the situation in detail, and formalizes the underlying theory.
An urban parallel can be drawn to the Hardin case, identifying a simi-
lar kind of prisoner's dilemma. The urban analogue of common-property
resources in rural communities is the condition of physical security and com-
parative social stability that provides the setting for the informal labor mar-
ket and allows predictability in patterns of social relations. These background
conditions in poor urban areas are as much subject to “degradation” as the
rural environment.
The circumstances in which population growth does actually lead to
impoverishment through these kind of mechanisms are those where cultural
or institutional factors impede collective or unilateral action at the local level
to limit degradation. Privatization of the resource (alienation or enclosure)
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and cooperative or state management of it are among the options that can
halt the decline, an outcome produced by proper alignment of the various
economic and political interests in play. Unfortunately, one route for pre-
venting overexploitation is through simple exclusion of some category of
claimants. Poverty for all, Hardin-style, may be avoided but not for the ex-
cluded group. Clearly critical for a poverty-alleviating outcome is a remedy
that also protects against adverse distributional effects. Finally, for longer-
run viability, the incentives that are set up should be such as to maintain or
increase per capita returns—by raising production or limiting further popu-
lation growth.
Low-level social equilibria
The preceding case falls squarely within a rational microeconomic
calculus. Theorists within this tradition tend to dismiss the notion that appar-
ently improvident or dysfunctional behavior might be explicable in terms of
“tradition” or “culture.” But as the understanding of how institutions emerge
has grown, so has a new appreciation of customary behavior.
Dasgupta (1993: 351) describes how enmeshed custom can create a
social equilibrium that gives rise to significant externalities:
In many societies, there are practices encouraging high fertility
rates which no household desires unilaterally to break. . . . [S]o
long as all others follow the practice and aim at large family
sizes, no household on its own will wish to deviate from the
practice; however, if all other households were to restrict their
42
fertility rates, each would desire to restrict its own fertility rate
as well. Thus, there can be multiple social equilibria, each sus-
tained by its own bootstraps, so to speak, and a society can get
stuck in one which, while it may have had a collective rationale
in the past, does not have one any more.
This picture, novel as it may be to modern economists, is close to the
perception of classical theorists like Malthus and Mill who saw education as
the input that could shake a society out of a poverty equilibrium. It recog-
nizes that values and preference sets are not fixed as assumed in most wel-
fare theory but are determined in the course of socialization and accultura-
tion and are modified by experience and opportunity, all processes that are
not independent of societal design.
A different kind of poverty equilibrium is vividly portrayed in the analy-
sis of social development by Robert D. Putnam (1993). Putnam describes an
n-person prisoner's dilemma over whether or not to put trust in civic institu-
tions. Expectations of economic progress take for granted a social infra-
structure based on some measure of trust—for instance, belief in security of
contract and in a degree of legal and administrative impartiality. This amounts
to a cooperative solution to the dilemma under which both the economy and
social capital can grow. But there is also a stable equilibrium of shared dis-
trust, with minimal social capital beyond the family and kin-group and a
self-reinforcing pattern of exploitative behavior that produces a meager eco-
nomic performance.
A social equilibrium would seem to bear some resemblance to the prob-
lematic idea of a class culture, and a low-level social equilibrium to that of a
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“culture of poverty.” These concepts have fallen into disuse in research, though
they clearly persist in popular understanding of, for example, the urban
underclass. Traits making up a culture of poverty included authoritarianism,
present-time orientation, and fatalism (O. Lewis 1961), with the all-too-easy
implication that they formed a coherent belief system resistant to change.
Critics of the concept preferred to see the behavior of low-income people as
a pragmatic response to deprivation and stress—as “responsive to the condi-
tions of life rather than to cultural guidelines” (Rodman 1968: 335). Policy
is thereby given something tangible to work with. “Traps” and similar equi-
librium concepts are always contingent on a modeling structure that, even if
initially valid, may be rendered obsolete by trends in the real world.
Unilateral transfers: offloading costs onto the weak
The two preceding scenarios have dealt with poverty arising from or
maintained by the presence of reciprocal negative externalities—situations
in which each family transfers some of its fertility costs onto the rest of
society and reciprocally bears part of others' costs itself, with the diffusion
of costs making remedial action difficult. Transfers of costs need not of course
be reciprocal. In the intrafamily case with which we started, children could
be disadvantaged by having many siblings: that is, there could be unilateral
transfers onto children within a household. There are other kinds of unilat-
eral transfers, however, some of which are probably more important in influ-
encing poverty outcomes.
Members of one community can worsen conditions in another through
environmental spillovers—for instance, through poor agricultural practices
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whose local effects can be avoided but that are felt elsewhere through, say,
pollution or flooding. They can also do so by exertion of political power or
direct force to gain an economic advantage, for example through alienation
of what previously had been common-property resources. In a weaker sense,
labor migration also represents a transfer of costs of population growth, in
this case onto participants in the recipient area's labor market. (Employers in
the recipient area may of course stand to benefit from greater labor market
competition, complicating the cost calculation.) Rural-urban migration can
sometimes be viewed in this way, as in the Brazilian case noted earlier. “Com-
munities” here would usually refer to territorially defined entities like vil-
lages or regions; quite analogous arguments, although for a possibly differ-
ent range of transfers, can apply to groups defined by economic status, such
as class or caste groups. Indigenous minorities are often the involuntary re-
cipients of offloaded costs associated with population growth elsewhere. In
some circumstances, women may be too.
Unilateral transfers with implications for poverty outcomes can also
be intertemporal. The next generation in a society “inherits” from the present
generation its physical and human capital, natural resources, and environ-
mental amenity. Under rapid population growth, population numbers would
often double in a generation, imposing a major dilution effect on this inher-
itance. It is the case of intrafamily transfers writ large. (There are many con-
ceptual and even ethical problems in delineating this case. Dasgupta [1993:
ch. 13] gives a brief treatment of them.)
The common feature of unilateral transfers is the inability of those on
whom the costs are imposed to organize effectively to protect their interests.
This may reflect the structural weakness of their position in the larger soci-
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ety, geographical remoteness, or, in the intertemporal case, inherent obstacles
to intergenerational contracting.
Poverty and the “threat economy”
The “threat economy” is a term of Kenneth Boulding's, applied to the
economy of arms races. At the micro level, however, resources similarly
have to be allocated to protection—against social predation. As the earlier
discussion of political stability suggested, demographic pressures are one
among various factors that might be expected to harm the social fabric. An
anecdotal account of such harm in various countries of West Africa and West
and Central Asia, arguing for at least partial demographic causation, is given
by R.D. Kaplan (1996). The erosion of social capital is not easily reversed:
indeed, it is likely to result in forms of social organization that are antitheti-
cal to economic and political development. Such forms—warlordism, for
instance—might offer protection for some but at the expense of predation on
others; plausibly they would entrench both pre-transition demographic out-
comes and widespread poverty.
LOCATING  POVERTY  BY SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC
CATEGORIES
Stories about the poverty effects of population change tend to focus on
processes rather than outcomes; they pay little attention to who the poor are.
A different and more conventionally demographic approach to the subject
would be organized around the socio-demographic categories in which the
poor are likely to be concentrated. A brief sketch will suffice here, since
most of the relevant materials have already been introduced.
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Poverty and women
Women are more often in poverty than men. Detailed statistical mate-
rials, for example from the 1995 Human Development Report, support the
proposition. A.M. Basu (1994: 18) finds conclusive evidence of “a wide-
spread disproportionate impact of poverty on women.” Kabeer (1996: 19)
remarks that women “are less able than men to translate labor into income,
income into choice and choice into personal well-being.”
Two fairly distinct phenomena are implicated. One relates to the status
of women who are widowed, divorced, or separated, and to the level of au-
tonomy and economic opportunity open to single women; the other, to the
position of women within marriage and within the household. The first of
these combines effects of gender with those of social isolation and old-age
dependency (sex differences in average age at marriage and in adult mortal-
ity mean that the single elderly are predominantly women). Poverty can be
linked to gender-differentiated aspects of law and social practice in areas of
property, inheritance, and occupational choice, and to the precarious eco-
nomics of single-person or single-parent households. Children, and sons es-
pecially, may be an important economic resource for widows—as stressed,
for instance, by Cain (1978)—but this fertility connection would plausibly
diminish as alternative sources of security emerge in the course of economic
development.
The second phenomenon is more complex. Its documentation hinges
on fairly intricate research on intrahousehold allocation and on assumptions
about nutritional needs, culture, and equity (see Haddad et al. 1997). South
Asia has been the locus of much of this research. Harriss (1990) presents a
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lengthy and thorough survey of the evidence and explanations for
intrahousehold food allocation in that region. External conditions may give
rise to a material rationale for discrimination against women and girls under
conditions of scarcity, in terms of a household's survival strategy in con-
fronting a labor market structured in favor of males and in terms of differ-
ences in expected future costs and returns to childraising between girls and
boys. There is also a cultural level of explanation, involving “observance of
the moral order governing distribution” of food (p. 409)—an order that seem-
ingly is poorly informed of nutritional basics. Allocative outcomes are con-
ditioned by patriarchal beliefs and social relations, but ones that exist as
much outside the household as within it. Harriss lists the various elaborate
proposals for “more or less highly targeted therapeutic interventions to rem-
edy nutritional discrimination” (p. 411) but is quite skeptical of their worth.
Poverty and children
Poverty might be expected to vary with the number of household mem-
bers economically active. Visaria (1980: 202–203) presents evidence of this
from a series of World Bank living standards surveys in Asian countries.
Ranking households by per capita expenditure, the age dependency ratio (of
persons outside the age-range 15–59 to persons within it) “varies inversely
with decile, virtually monotonically.” The ratio for the top decile is a half or
a third that for the bottom decile. Most of this effect is variation in child
dependency.
The distinction of two- versus one-earner families has become salient
in many industrialized societies and results in substantial differences in child
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poverty rates. The family-structure contrast between two-parent and female-
headed families largely reflects this difference in earning capacity. For the
United States, child poverty rates as of 1988 were 10 percent for two-parent
families, 54 percent for female-headed families (Galston 1996: 276).
Poverty that is linked to high child dependency derives from two main
sources: the income-diluting effect of a larger number of dependent consum-
ers and the behavioral effect of socioeconomic status on fertility. (There may
of course be other contributing factors as well.) The first of these compo-
nents would presumably diminish as children become economically active,
but it is not less real for being transitory. It may also have long-run conse-
quential effects by curtailing children's education in the interests of raising
family income.
To the extent that poorer families have more children, the proportion
of children in poverty will be higher than the proportion of families or of
adults in poverty. The usual pattern of fertility decline can exacerbate this
effect. Jones and Potter (1978: 22) cited the case of Colombia over a period
during which the annual growth rate decreased from 3.1 percent to 2.2 per-
cent: “when the birth rate was above 45 in 1964 about half of each cohort
was born into the poorest 50 percent of all households. In 1973, when the
birth rate had declined to the low thirties, the share of children born into
these households increased to about two-thirds.”
In democratic welfare states, fertility decline can also worsen child
poverty through the political arena. The proportionately more numerous eld-
erly brought about by population aging acquire greater influence over social
policy, particularly as it affects the direction and scale of transfer payments.
Payments that benefit the older age groups may become politically unassail-
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able, so that any constraints on the overall scale of budgetary transfers are
disproportionately felt by other potential claimants—notably, poor families
with dependent children. This is the generational politics argument devel-
oped in Preston (1984).
Poverty and the aged or disabled
In most developing societies welfare-state institutions are in their in-
fancy. In particular, broad-based provisions for old-age security have yet to
emerge. Only a minority of employees, chiefly in the public sector, are cov-
ered by pension schemes. Instead, the state takes it for granted that old-age
security should be the responsibility of families. It may even enshrine this
obligation in law, as in the 1980 marriage law of China, seeking to insist on
familial responsibility against the forces tending to erode it. But such efforts,
whether hortatory or regulatory, seem bound to fail—if only because, with
declining fertility, networks of kin become thinner (see Lutz 1989) and the
burden of upward transfers per working member of the family increases.
Moreover, there would remain a need to provide for the childless elderly and
for those whose families for whatever reason default on this obligation.
Many elderly would of course expect to support themselves from ac-
cumulated assets. Some part of a family's support of its aged members is in
fact a graduated process of asset transfer. Poverty among the old is concen-
trated among those with few or no assets: to a first approximation, it is a
continuation of poverty among the population in general. The additional
components are contributed by ill-health and disability, by increased vulner-
ability to predation, and by whatever structural disadvantage there may be in
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the society's treatment of widowhood. To the extent that low fertility and
consequent population aging are occurring in contemporary societies at lower
economic levels than experienced historically, problems of old-age support
and of old-age poverty are the greater.
Ill-health and disability are causes of poverty that are not only felt in
old age. Disability in the sense of productivity impairment is not a well-
defined concept: the degree of impairment may depend on numerous tech-
nological, societal, and policy factors and be specific to occupation. Certain
disease regimes, however, almost guarantee poverty—e.g. river blindness
(see Evans 1989).
Poverty and refugees
Most refugees are in poverty virtually by definition, stripped of assets
and income. The formal specification of a refugee, entailing international
displacement and a well-founded fear of persecution, covers only a fraction
of those in effectively similar situations. Indeed, political activism would
often connote persons with significant human capital who, in new circum-
stances, could rapidly climb out of poverty. Persons suffering internal dis-
placement within a country are seldom better off and may be in appreciably
worse situations than those afforded UNHCR recognition across the border.
The earlier discussions of the social order and the threat economy consid-
ered refugee-creating processes that were at least partially associated with
population growth.
A conceptually and statistically more elusive category is what have
become known as environmental refugees: persons displaced by changes in
the physical environment rather than by military force or civil conflict. Some
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estimates put these numbers at many millions. There are evidently clear-cut
cases of forced displacement as a consequence of rapid deterioration of the
resource base or the flooding of agricultural land by newly dammed rivers;
but aside from such cases there is no sharp dividing line between those mi-
grating to avoid a drop in living standards caused by environmental degra-
dation and those seeking an improved standard of living elsewhere.
POPULATION  POLICY  AND POVERTY  ALLEVIATION
Poverty and fertility are not in themselves policy instruments, in the
sense of one of them being able to be modified so as to affect the other.
Lessening poverty will not necessarily bring down high fertility (for inequality
in general, the difficulties are discussed in the exchange between Boulier
1982 and Repetto 1982). Nor will a fertility decline in itself necessarily help
to alleviate poverty (see, for example, Rodgers et al. 1989). But dismissing
policy prospects at that broad level does not dispose of the matter. The policy
domains within which population and poverty are open to intentional influ-
ence intersect, allowing for measures that impinge on both areas—with pos-
sibilities for generating “virtuous circles” and “win-win” outcomes benefit-
ing both. Because population-poverty relationships are institutionally
contingent, such measures have to be tailored to the specific situation. How-
ever, a few more general observations can be made.
Programmatic policies: education, health, family planning
Both poverty and the components of population growth (fertility espe-
cially) are what might be described as devolved phenomena. They refer to
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individual- or family-level characteristics and behaviors. They are reachable
by government only through broadscale extension services or by policies
that yield welfare gains across the income distribution and across gender
lines—or, we need to add, by the elaborate measures of administrative con-
trol entailed in detailed “targeting” of policy. This devolution makes for a
degree of consonance in policies directed at limiting population growth and
those concerned with poverty alleviation.
Improvements in education and health are closely linked to demographic
modernization. Caldwell's (1986) analysis of low-mortality “outliers” among
poor countries argues the mortality case; the fertility relationship is attested
by numerous quantitative studies. Significantly, education and health are
precisely the sectors where government action, properly designed, can also
most readily serve redistributive ends. Sectoral budgets themselves may not
mean much: universities and high-technology hospitals can consume large
amounts of resources but reach few in the population and raise rather than
reduce economic inequality. Primary and secondary schooling and primary
health care are the relevant extension services, contributing directly to
wellbeing as well as to earning capacity.  Achievement of high primary- and
secondary-school enrollment rates necessitates near universality of service
provision; and to be effective, primary health care must similarly be widely
available at the local level and acceptable in quality.
The administrative and financial structures of these sectors are also
relevant to their impact.  Accountability to clients may be a surer means of
achieving service quality than bureaucratic supervision.  Such accountabil-
ity is more likely to be found where the financing of services includes a
significant locally raised component—through local taxes and perhaps user
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fees (provided access is not thereby skewed).  De facto, such devolved fi-
nancing is often the case, but without insistence on accountability.
There is some evidence at the macro level that rapid population growth
is associated with poorer budgetary provision for education and health (see
G.W.  Jones 1990).  This is a disputed area, however.  Budgets reflect gov-
ernment priorities, and social services often do not rank very high.  Condi-
tionality stipulations—particularly those associated with structural adjust-
ment programs—are sometimes blamed for this ranking, but the case tends
to be weak.  Conditionality may even work in the opposite direction: the
1990 World Development Report argued that aid allocations “should be based
on a demonstrated commitment to the goal of reducing poverty” (p. 141).  A
more significant influence on budgeting is likely to be the political and lob-
bying forces surrounding the process at the top level—as implied in Kaushik
Basu’s (1990: 370) trenchant comment that “South Asian economies are Fi-
nance Minister neutral.”
Family planning programs, at least in their pre-Cairo formulation, are
in essence just another kind of extension service. The client-demand may be
softer than in the case of health and education, but the administrative re-
quirements qua program are not radically different. Their welfare effect on
the poor is less easily identified, however. Most of this review has assumed
that fertility outcomes reflect the interests of parents or families; but some
part of fertility reflects ineffectiveness of available birth control methods.
Access to safe and effective birth control is likely to be strongly associated
with parents' socioeconomic status, in particular with education and income.
Thus “unwanted” fertility is disproportionately found among the poor. Fam-
ily planning programs, aimed principally at those who lack access to private
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sources of modern contraception, thus have an important distributional di-
mension: the services they provide, in addition to any social gain that may
come from reduced fertility, offer a private gain mostly to the poor. (This, of
course, assumes that the services are fully voluntary; if they are not, the
social gain would be set against a private cost.)
Family planning post-Cairo, with its aim of cutting back any explicit
demographic intentions and focusing instead on improving the reproductive
health of women and their access to high-quality services, is still closer to an
extension service—conceptually not distinct from other more or less spe-
cialized components of the health program. The changed orientation may
attenuate the program's redistributive effect: as service quality is raised, the
program may well find itself catering to a more middle-class clientele than
before.
Target groups versus rising tide
If women are overrepresented among the poor, measures to lessen pov-
erty, many would argue, are reasonably directed disproportionately toward
women. Analogous propositions would apply to the various other popula-
tion categories where poverty rates are high: children, the elderly, ethnic
minorities, inhabitants of particular backward regions, and so on—depend-
ing on the specific circumstances in the society. As the numbers in such
categories start adding up to appreciable fractions of the whole population,
the benefits proffered come to include a large consumer surplus and become
unaffordable. If the poor within each target group can be identified, how-
ever, the group designation becomes redundant.
Consider policies that might lessen female poverty. The structural causes
of poverty, such as women's second-class status in inheritance and property
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rights in some societies, may be resistant to change except over the long run;
indirect means of enhancing female earning power and autonomy may have
more prospects of near-term effect. Ensuring equal access to education is
clearly important, as is ensuring that health and family planning programs
cater to the needs of poor families. To the extent that net fertility and
childraising costs fall more heavily on women than men, the economic ben-
efit of these programs also goes disproportionately to women. Design changes
in certain other government extension activities can make them more ori-
ented to women—for example, in credit systems or in the targeting of agri-
cultural extension services in situations where food crops are predominantly
cultivated by women.
What of the demographic effect of these measures? There is a general
belief that policies to improve women's autonomy—particularly in their access
to education and health services—are effective in reducing both fertility and
mortality (A.M. Basu 1992: 241). Evidence on the mortality side seems in-
contestable; on fertility, the case is somewhat blurred by the prominent in-
stances of fertility decline under much less than autonomous circumstances.
Attention to gender equity resounds in international declarations and
covenants; it has become one of the routine emphases of the policy recom-
mendations of international agencies. Increasingly, it is translated into prac-
tice by national governments. For example, Knodel and Jones (1996) find
that gender inequality in access to secondary education is fast diminishing in
much of the developing world. However, these authors caution that poverty
considerations may get neglected along the way: “in most developing coun-
tries a specific gender focus [in education] is misplaced, or should be given
only secondary priority relative to reducing socioeconomic inequality for
both sexes” (p. 698).
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Programmatic efforts and the targeting that typically accompanies them
entail close government involvement. Less statist development strategies
would rely primarily on aggregate growth in the economy to raise base-level
wages and absorb unskilled labor, and to effect changes in demand (for edu-
cation and for health and family planning services) that in turn elicit private-
sector responses. The now-universal early development strategy of encour-
agement of labor-intensive manufactured exports is directed at overall
economic growth rather than specifically at poverty reduction, but it was the
underpinning of the “growth with equity” performance of the East Asian
economies—and promises significant poverty alleviation elsewhere. The large
ideological gap between the programmatic and growth-promotion approaches
is narrowed in practice by the common fact of governments falling well
short of declared program intent, together with de facto part-privatization of
their operations, and by the substantial if behind-the-scenes management
role governments have taken in some of the most successful cases of eco-
nomic growth.
Institutional renovation
Poverty traps of the kind discussed earlier in this review are cases where
the patterns of economic, social, or political organization create the wrong
incentives for individuals or groups, resulting in economic decline, environ-
mental degradation, or decay of social capital. There are no general rules to
apply in these cases—even the economist's dictum of internalizing the exter-
nalities is not always appropriate. Each case warrants separate analysis. Find-
ing a way out is often not difficult in theory but may be very difficult in
practice.
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One kind of policy intervention is aimed at dealing with the environ-
ment of risk faced by the poor. Mink (1993) emphasizes security of tenure
for farmers and urban squatters and collective rights in the case of common-
property resources. This helps to lengthen time horizons and lessen the “min-
ing” of resources. Institutional programs to cope with crisis events such as
crop failure, so as to prevent distress sale of land, are also called for—such
as formal or informal crop insurance, or supplementary public works schemes
like that of Maharashtra (Cain 1981).
For those suffering from unilateral cost transfers and not able to orga-
nize to protect their interests, the options are few. Government may be per-
suaded to exercise a supervening authority in halting the transfers or grant-
ing some compensation; more often, little is done and perhaps little can be
done. If overall poverty is on a downward trend, there is rarely any insistence on
ensuring that the growth path obeys strict principles of Pareto improvement.
The most intractable setting for policy is that of the failed state, where
much of the physical infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed and mini-
mal social capital remains. While there is ample reason for pessimism that
any development progress is possible in the worst cases, there are instances
of countries that have undergone a prolonged deterioration in civil order but
are again moving up. Ghana and Uganda are cases in point. People retain
institutional memories, of course, but the scope for institutional redesign in
such circumstances is potentially large.
Poverty, authoritarianism, and democracy
A number of East and Southeast Asian countries have witnessed both a
remarkable performance in economic growth over several decades (though
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lately encountering some serious problems) and at the same time major re-
ductions in both poverty and fertility. The achievement is widely applauded,
but variously interpreted. Birdsall et al. (1995) emphasize measures that raised
productivity of the poor: promotion of a dynamic agricultural sector and labor-
demanding, export-oriented manufacturing; and rapid expansion of basic
education. One of the “virtuous circles” they identify has the growing num-
bers of educated workers eroding the scarcity rents of the more educated,
reinforcing low inequality and further increasing the labor demand. Equally
virtuous is the economic gain from the reduction in child dependency fol-
lowing from the fertility decline that the economic expansion promoted.
Indonesia's experience from the 1970s to the mid-1990s in most ways
typifies this policy model (see Hill 1996). Between 1976 and 1993 the pov-
erty rate in Indonesia declined from 40 percent to 13 percent, and the num-
bers in poverty halved (to 25 million). Fertility fell substantially too, from a
total fertility rate of above 5 to around 3. By the mid-1970s, the reformist
government that had come to power in 1967 had stabilized the economy and
embarked on rehabilitation of the badly run-down physical infrastructure. It
had moved strongly to support the food crop sector, through promotion of
green revolution technologies and subsidized inputs. It had also initiated a
vigorous family planning program that mobilized the newly energized civil
administration in support of its extension services. Fortuitously, government
resources were boosted by the revenues from higher oil prices in the 1970s,
a significant proportion of which were channeled into local infrastructure
and development projects and improvements in the education and health
systems. Subsequently, in the 1980s, Indonesia began to achieve strong growth
of labor-intensive manufactured exports—along the lines earlier pioneered
by Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
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These factors in combination fairly readily explain both the reduction
in poverty and the demographic change. (For poverty reduction it helped, of
course, that Indonesia did not start with large concentrations of private wealth
in its agricultural sector—unlike, say, the Philippines.) Job creation, higher
agricultural productivity, and improved health and education enhanced earn-
ings power at the grass-roots level. These same trends, together with changed
expectations about the economic future and recognition of the need for (and
costs of) education, lowered family size goals. An effective distribution sys-
tem for modern contraceptives met the consequent demand for birth con-
trol—though administrative pressures were used in some measure to supple-
ment it.
The strong performance that Indonesia showed over these decades on
both poverty alleviation and fertility decline was mutually reinforcing. In
the new conditions “quality” of children mattered more than “quantity.”
Greater grass-roots opportunities raised the demand for and use of birth con-
trol at the lower end of the income distribution; and reduction in fertility
among the poor helped their economic circumstances. The severe regional
economic crisis encountered in 1997 may for a time reverse the decline in
poverty but the demographic gains are unlikely to be affected.
A contentious aspect of the East Asian experience is the restrictions on
political freedom found in much of the region. This issue lies mainly outside
the scope of the present review, though it bears on the evaluation of the East
Asian case—particularly in comparison to South Asia. It requires mention
here, however, because some major writers on population and poverty like
Amartya Sen and Partha Dasgupta regard it as highly relevant to the defini-
tion of wellbeing, and because the case is sometimes made that it is empiri-
cally tied to the favorable demographic and development outcomes.
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Whether poverty ought to incorporate a political dimension is some-
what questionable. It may be to overload the concept. As noted earlier, the
elaborate composite indexes that proliferate in the successive Human Devel-
opment Reports arguably have this problem in attempting to bridge mea-
sures of income and health. An index of political freedom, a potential end to
a still longer bridge, appeared in an early Human Development Report, but
soon disappeared under objections from low-scoring states. International com-
parison might be as well served by a series of sectorally confined measures.
A political dimension frequently intrudes in population policy—not in
family planning rhetoric, where the fully voluntaristic model prevails, but in
practice (see McNicoll 1997). Birth control programs, like many other gov-
ernment activities, draw on the administrative power of the state. An au-
thoritarian state tends to run authoritarian programs, whether in fertility or in
the kinds of extension services that have contributed to a reduction in pov-
erty as narrowly construed. At least early in the course of development, pro-
gram effectiveness, it seems, does not imply or require democracy. Once the
development process has lifted a society significantly above subsistence lev-
els, however, the case for taking seriously this further dimension of wellbeing,
and the voice for service quality that it makes room for, rapidly gains strength.
CONCLUSION
The “restatement” of the population-poverty relationship set out in this
essay began with the agnostic conclusions of cross-country multivariate analy-
sis. These are part of a perennially unfinished research agenda that seem-
ingly extends across most of the subject of the consequences of population
growth at the aggregate level. Closure is unlikely even if the latest positive
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associations of fertility decline with economic growth are borne out. The
problem here, I believe, is one of flawed expectations: what should be sought
is not some final measure of statistical association such as a tight regression
equation, but a collation of insights about how the world works. In the popu-
lation-poverty case, this means insights that take account of the environ-
mentally and institutionally configured setting of the relationship at a vari-
ety of levels—local, sectoral, and national. Such insights can emerge from
elaborate case studies, but also from ad hoc comparisons and stylized mod-
els. While there is always an appetite for new data, the more immediate need
is to pull together and interpret existing analyses and findings. The materials
referred to above are a sampling of these.
The organizing framework I have used distinguished “direct” influ-
ences of population growth on economic distribution and hence poverty out-
comes from influences working through environmental change and change
in the social order and governance. In turn, poverty outcomes could be ana-
lyzed in terms of the economic transfers generating them—such transfers
typically enjoying at least local stability, with the winners able to sustain the
arrangement or the losers unable to disrupt it.
Equilibrium traps, of course, can be escaped from. Simple geographic
mobility offers one route: the option of “exit.” Organizational change or
other kinds of local institutional reform can also offer escapes—for example,
by improving production incentives or by mobilizing collective efforts to
enforce distributional changes (typically through demands on government).
And programmatic interventions, either intentionally or sometimes as an al-
most incidental byproduct of their main purpose, transform local percep-
tions and realities in ways that create new avenues of economic mobility and
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associated demographic behavior. These options make up most of the usual
repertoire of policy measures bearing on population and poverty.
Such a policy set encounters dissent from two directions. On one side
are those who are opposed to any linking of demographic concerns with
poverty alleviation. They claim to see the ancient debates over the Poor Laws
and over the harsh Malthusian response continuing in new guise, the poor in
effect being blamed for their fertility as well as their poverty. A residue of
the stance that population control was a counter-revolutionary measure may
have lain behind the downplaying of demography in the Cairo Programme
of Action—in which a welter of policy recommendations contained a radical
program of social reform but dealt hardly at all with fertility regulation.
Dissenters on the other side, in my view with a more substantial case,
hold simply that these intervention efforts may be sideline activities largely
unconnected to the main game of creating a modern economy and the pros-
perity it affords—with one byproduct being a modern demographic regime.
(Other byproducts, it can fairly be hoped, would be improved environmental
quality and a democratic polity.) Most writers on the policy dimensions of
poverty and population are concerned with the incontestable direct effects of
intervention programs—their immediate, measurable benefits to clients—
and with possible improvements in program design, matters they would see
as central to the policymaking enterprise. To them, a single-minded empha-
sis on economic growth would be neglecting some of the most important
elements of public policy affecting human welfare. But perhaps they are
merely tinkering. India’s development performance was assessed in the T mes
Literary Supplement by two of its most distinguished economists on the fif-
tieth anniversary of independence. Amartya Sen wrote of the country’s
achievements in health, democratic government, and economic advance, al-
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beit slow. Jagdish Bhagwati (1997) described India’s entire apparatus of eco-
nomic administration as “this remarkable machine for producing backwardness.”
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